区块链会议投稿资讯CCF A--WINE 2024 截止7.15 附录用率附录用的区块链文章

本文主要是介绍区块链会议投稿资讯CCF A--WINE 2024 截止7.15 附录用率附录用的区块链文章，希望对大家解决编程问题提供一定的参考价值，需要的开发者们随着小编来一起学习吧！

Conference：The Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)

CCF level：CCF A

Categories：Cross-cutting/comprehensive/emerging

Year：2024

Conference time： December 2-5, 2024

录用率： selected 66 papers from 221 submissions for presentation at WINE 2023, leading to a very competitive acceptance rate of just below 30%. 其中区块链论文1篇（文末展示）

Submissions about Web and Internet Economics are invited in, but not limited to, the following topics:

Auctions and pricing
Behavioral economics and behavioral modeling
Blockchains and their applications
Computational advertising
Computational aspects of equilibria
Computational social choice
Coalitions, coordination, and collective action
Decision theory
Econometrics, ML and Data Science
Economic and strategic aspects of machine learning models
Fair division
Information design including contest and contract design
Information elicitation
Learning in games and markets
Market design
Matching markets
Mechanism design
Network games
Online platforms and applications
Privacy, fairness, and security
Revenue management
Social networks

Important Dates

Paper submission deadline: July 15, 2024, AoE

Author notification: On or before September 16, 2024

Camera-ready deadline: October 8, 2024

详情：https://wine2024.org/

Title:

Blockchain Participation Games

区块链参与博弈

Authors:

Abstract:

We study game-theoretic models for capturing participation in blockchain systems. Existing blockchains can be naturally viewed as games, where a set of potentially interested users is faced with the dilemma of whether to engage with the protocol or not. Engagement here implies that the user will be asked to complete certain tasks, whenever she is selected to contribute, according to some stochastic process. Apart from the basic dilemma of engaging or not, even more strategic considerations arise in systems where users may be able to declare participation and then retract (while still being able to receive rewards). We propose two models for studying such games, with the first one focusing on the basic dilemma of engaging or not, whereas the latter focuses on the retraction effects. In both models we provide characterization results or necessary conditions on the structure of Nash equilibria. Our findings reveal that appropriate reward mechanisms can be used to stimulate participation and avoid negative effects of free riding, results that are in line with real world blockchain system deployments.

我们研究用于捕捉区块链系统参与度的博弈论模型。现有的区块链可以自然地看作是博弈，其中一组潜在感兴趣的用户面临着是否参与协议的困境。这里的参与意味着，每当用户被选中做出贡献时，她都会被要求根据一些随机过程完成某些任务。除了参与与否的基本困境之外，在用户可以宣布参与然后撤回（同时仍然能够获得奖励）的系统中，还会出现更多的战略考虑。我们提出了两种研究此类博弈的模型，第一种模型关注参与与否的基本困境，而第二种模型关注撤回效应。在这两个模型中，我们都提供了纳什均衡结构的特征结果或必要条件。我们的研究结果表明，可以使用适当的奖励机制来刺激参与并避免搭便车的负面影响，这些结果与现实世界的区块链系统部署一致。