本文主要是介绍那些冠状病毒联系人追踪应用程序发生了什么?,希望对大家解决编程问题提供一定的参考价值,需要的开发者们随着小编来一起学习吧!
重点 (Top highlight)
By Sara Harrison
萨拉·哈里森(Sara Harrison)
Contact tracing — monitoring who’s getting COVID-19 and tracking down anyone who might have been in contact with that person so they can quarantine — has long been considered a key to slowing and eventually ending the pandemic.
Ç防尘带追踪-监控谁是越来越COVID-19和跟踪任何人谁可能已经在与此人,使他们能够隔离接触-一直被认为是一个关键,以减缓并最终结束这一流行病。
Health departments around the country (and world) have been staffing up on human contact tracers. Meanwhile, in April, Google and Apple announced they were teaming up to develop a way to do the job through smartphones. The result, released in May, is the Google and Apple Exposure Notification system.
全国(及世界)的卫生部门一直在配备人类接触追踪器。 同时,在四月,谷歌和苹果宣布他们正在合作开发一种通过智能手机完成这项工作的方法。 结果于5月份发布,就是Google和Apple曝光通知系统 。
The service is an application programming interface (API) that provides public health officials with a framework for developing a contact tracing app of their own. That framework allows users to download an app on their phones that runs in the background. When they spend more than a few minutes with another person, the two phones communicate through Bluetooth, exchanging identification codes that change every 10 to 20 minutes. If one of those users reports a positive COVID-19 test result, all the phones they’ve encountered will receive an alert, warning them they may have been exposed.
该服务是一个应用程序编程接口(API),可为公共卫生官员提供一个框架,以开发他们自己的联系人跟踪应用程序。 该框架允许用户下载在后台运行的手机上的应用程序。 当他们与另一个人在一起花费的时间超过几分钟时,这两部手机会通过蓝牙进行通信,并交换每10至20分钟更改一次的识别码。 如果这些用户之一报告的COVID-19测试结果为肯定,则他们遇到的所有电话都会收到警报,警告他们可能已经被暴露。
The API doesn’t collect location information or allow the data it collects to be stored in centralized servers — proponents consider those privacy protections key to widespread adoption of the technology.
API不会收集位置信息,也不会将其收集的数据存储在集中式服务器中-支持者认为这些隐私保护是该技术广泛采用的关键。
“The simplest way of thinking about [Google-Apple Exposure Notification] is that it never shares information about you that could be used to deanonymize you,” said Dan Kohn, general manager at Linux Foundation Public Health, which is helping deploy apps that rely on the Google-Apple API in several states, including Pennsylvania.
Linux Foundation Public Health总经理Dan Kohn表示:“考虑[Google-Apple Exposure Notification]的最简单方法是,它永远不会共享可用来对您进行匿名处理的有关您的信息。”在包括宾夕法尼亚州在内的多个州的Google-Apple API上使用。
“It’s not about trusting Google, or trusting Apple, or trusting your public health authority,” he said.
他说:“这与信任Google,信任Apple或信任公共卫生当局无关。”
Kohn believes the system is the world’s best shot at quickly and effectively notifying people of possible exposure to COVID-19 — but there are many critiques out there and a host of competitors. The apps have not yet gained widespread usage, but they are rolling out slowly.
Kohn认为,该系统是在快速有效地通知人们可能接触COVID-19方面的全球最佳选择-但其中存在许多批评和许多竞争对手。 这些应用程序尚未获得广泛使用,但正在缓慢推出。
到目前为止,谁在使用联系人跟踪应用程序? (Who’s Using Contact Tracing Apps So Far?)
Adoption of the Google-Apple Exposure Notification API has been slow in the United States. State health officials in Alabama and Virginia released the first U.S. apps based on the API earlier this month.
在美国,采用Google-Apple Exposure Notification API的速度很慢。 本月初, 阿拉巴马州和弗吉尼亚州的州卫生官员发布了第一批基于API的美国应用程序。
But pickup has been greater around the world. Sixteen nations, including Japan, Saudi Arabia, Latvia, Gibraltar, and Uruguay have created apps that rely on the API. In Ireland, a nation with a population of roughly 4.8 million people, the government’s COVID Tracker app, which launched in early July, has been downloaded 1.4 million times.
但是在世界范围内,皮卡的普及程度更高。 包括日本,沙特阿拉伯,拉脱维亚,直布罗陀和乌拉圭在内的16个国家/地区已经创建了依赖API的应用程序。 在爱尔兰这个人口约480万的国家,政府的COVID Tracker应用程序于7月初启动,已下载140万次,该应用程序于7月初启动。
Germany initially announced it would create its own app, in which data would be stored on one government server instead of on individual users’ phones. The app would have required Apple to change certain settings on iPhones. After the company refused and hundreds of academics signed a letter warning of privacy concerns, German officials adopted the Google-Apple approach instead. Since launching in mid-June, the country’s Corona-Warn-App has been downloaded more than 16 million times. Similarly, after the much-publicized failure of its homegrown contact tracing app, the U.K. is also creating an app using the Google-Apple API.
德国最初宣布将创建自己的应用程序,其中的数据将存储在一台政府服务器上,而不是存储在个人用户的手机上。 该应用程序需要Apple更改iPhone上的某些设置。 在公司拒绝并数百名学者签署了一封有关隐私问题的警告信之后 ,德国官员改为采用Google-Apple方法 。 自6月中旬发布以来,该国的Corona-Warn-App已被下载超过1600万次 。 同样,在广为人知的自家联系人追踪应用失败之后,英国也正在使用Google-Apple API创建一个应用。
In a July 31 press release, Dave Burke, Google’s vice president of engineering, announced, “In the United States, 20 states and territories — representing approximately 45 percent of the U.S. population — are exploring apps based on ENS (exposure notification system).”
在7月31日的新闻稿中 ,谷歌工程副总裁戴夫·伯克(Dave Burke)宣布:“在美国,代表美国人口约45%的20个州和地区正在探索基于ENS(曝光通知系统)的应用。 ”
In an email to The Markup, Julie Grimes, a representative of the Virginia Department of Health wrote, “One of the major reasons Virginia went with the Apple and Google API, is because of privacy concerns.” She went on to explain that no location data or personal information from the app is ever collected, stored, tracked, or transmitted to the Department of Health.
弗吉尼亚卫生部的代表朱莉·格里姆斯(Julie Grimes)在给The Markup的电子邮件中写道:“弗吉尼亚使用Apple和Google API的主要原因之一是出于隐私方面的考虑。” 她继续解释说,从未收集,存储,跟踪或传输过该应用程序中的位置数据或个人信息。
The Association of Public Health Laboratories, an industry group that represents local, state, and national laboratories, recently announced it will work with Google, Apple, and Microsoft to make sure apps launching in different states are interoperable. The European Union is taking similar steps.
代表地方,州和国家实验室的行业组织公共卫生实验室协会最近宣布 ,它将与Google,Apple和Microsoft合作,以确保在不同州启动的应用程序可以互操作。 欧洲联盟正在采取类似步骤 。
And the apps may not need huge penetration to have some effect on virus transmission. This model from a research group at Oxford suggests that even if only 20 to 40 percent of residents actually download and use a contact tracing app, it could still reduce the number of daily infections.
而且这些应用可能不需要大量的渗透即可对病毒传播产生一定的影响。 牛津大学一个研究小组的模型表明 ,即使只有20%到40%的居民实际下载并使用联系人跟踪应用程序,它仍然可以减少每日感染的次数。
为什么所有人都不跳船? (Why Isn’t Everyone Jumping on Board?)
Technical and privacy challenges have led to slow adoption, though some of those concerns have been addressed.
技术和隐私方面的挑战导致应用缓慢,尽管其中一些问题已得到解决。
The API initially didn’t require any kind of verification when users uploaded positive test results, leaving it vulnerable to trolling — anyone could have potentially entered false positives and undermined faith in the system. Google and Apple have since created guidelines for developers to create a verification server. When users get their test results, they receive a code that has to be entered into the app and confirmed by the server. In Germany, testing labs provide users with a QR code when they receive their results.
当用户上载肯定的测试结果时,API最初不需要任何类型的验证, 因此很容易被欺骗-任何人都可能输入假阳性并破坏了对系统的信心。 此后,谷歌和苹果为开发人员创建验证服务器创建了指南。 当用户获得测试结果时,他们将收到一个必须输入到应用中并由服务器确认的代码。 在德国,测试实验室在收到结果时会为他们提供QR码。
There are also concerns that systems like the Google and Apple API are vulnerable to spoofing — meaning a person could hijack Bluetooth signals. In an email to The Markup, Bennett Cyphers, a staff technologist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, said there hasn’t been any evidence that this type of spoofing has happened yet, but it remains a concern. “This could lead to a lot of false positives, where people receive exposure notifications for people that they were never actually near,” he wrote. “I haven’t seen proposals by the tech companies or the app developers to address this.”
还有人担心,像Google和Apple API这样的系统很容易受到欺骗 ,这意味着人们可能劫持蓝牙信号。 电子前沿基金会的技术人员Bennett Cyphers在给The Markup的电子邮件中说,目前还没有任何证据表明这种欺骗已经发生,但是仍然值得关注。 他写道:“这可能会导致许多误报,使人们收到实际上从未在附近的人的暴露通知。” “我还没有看到技术公司或应用程序开发人员提出的解决此问题的建议。”
Apple and Google didn’t respond to questions about the API’s vulnerability to spoofing or trolling.
苹果和谷歌没有回答有关API的欺骗或拖延漏洞的问题。
Bluetooth, which Google and Apple rely on to sense proximity to other users, can also be inaccurate, said Greg Nojeim, senior counsel and director of the Freedom, Security and Technology Project at the Center for Democracy and Technology.
民主与技术中心自由,安全与技术项目高级顾问兼主任格雷格·诺吉姆(Greg Nojeim)表示,谷歌和苹果依靠蓝牙来感知与其他用户的接近度也是不准确的。
“If the Bluetooth signal has to pass through fabric like your pants pocket, that degrades the signal and suggests you might be more distant from the person than you really are,” he said. Alternatively, Bluetooth signals could create false positives if they pass through walls and detect proximity to a person who does not epidemiologically present a risk.
他说:“如果蓝牙信号必须像裤子口袋那样穿过织物,那会使信号质量下降,并暗示您与人的距离可能比实际距离更远。” 另外,如果蓝牙信号穿过墙壁并检测到没有流行病学风险的人,则蓝牙信号可能会产生误报。
And communities that are contracting COVID-19 at the highest rates also generally have less access to smartphones or may be less likely to trust apps endorsed by the government or by big tech companies.
而且,以最高费率签约COVID-19的社区通常也较少使用智能手机,或者不太可能信任政府或大型科技公司认可的应用 。
“There’s also the question that resources are not diverted from [human] contact tracing within communities where we know there are disproportionate rates of infection,” Nojeim said.
诺吉姆说:“还有一个问题是,在我们知道感染率不成比例的社区内,资源没有从[人类]接触者追踪中转移。”
And there’s no real guarantee that the apps will even work.
并没有真正保证这些应用程序能够正常运行。
“Masks have been proven effective and there’s a consensus in the health community that masking protects others,” said Nojeim. “It’s not the same with exposure notification apps.” It’s not clear that the Bluetooth will work properly, that people will upload positive results when they get them, or that people will self-isolate after being warned about a potential exposure.
诺吉姆说:“面具已经被证明是有效的,并且在健康界已经达成共识,遮盖可以保护他人。” “与曝光通知应用程序不同。” 尚不清楚蓝牙能否正常工作,人们在获得积极成果时会上传积极的结果,还是人们在被警告可能存在暴露后会自我隔离。
一些地方正在开发自己的技术 (Some Places Are Developing Their Own Technology)
Many jurisdictions have chosen to use other types of contact-tracing apps that are more privacy invasive — and thus more helpful to public health officials, those officials say.
那些官员说,许多司法管辖区都选择使用其他类型的接触跟踪应用程序,这些应用程序更具隐私侵入性,因此对公共卫生官员更有帮助。
China, for instance, has an app that people in the country are required to download and is used to enforce quarantine after exposure. The app shares information, including location data and users’ identification codes, with a central server that may also be accessible to the police.
例如,中国有一个应用程序 ,要求该国的人们下载该应用程序 ,并用于在暴露后实施隔离。 该应用程序与中央服务器共享信息,包括位置数据和用户的标识代码,该中央服务器也可以由警察访问。
Rhode Island’s Crush Covid RI app uses GPS data that users can choose to share if they test positive. According to the app’s website, “Anonymous information you provide to the Rhode Island Department of Health (never including your name, contact number, home, or work address) could be used to better understand where the disease may be spreading. For example, if there is a location (e.g. a supermarket) where 20 other people also became positive in the same timeframe, that location may need to be closed and sanitized.”
罗德岛的Crush Covid RI应用程序使用GPS数据,如果测试结果呈阳性,用户可以选择共享。 根据该应用程序的网站 ,“您提供给罗德岛州卫生局的匿名信息(绝不包括您的姓名,联系电话,家庭或工作地址)可以用来更好地了解该疾病可能在哪里传播。 例如,如果某个地点(例如一家超市)在同一时间内其他20个人也变得积极向上,那么该地点可能需要关闭并进行消毒。”
Initially, Utah’s Healthy Together app used both Bluetooth and GPS data so state public health officials would have a better sense of where and how the virus was spreading. The app also gave public officials and Twenty Holdings Inc., which helped develop the app, access to personally identifying information like users’ names, location data, and phone numbers. But after Utah launched the app in April, only 200 people downloaded it. Officials decided to turn off the GPS function in June.
最初,犹他州的Healthy Together应用程序同时使用了蓝牙和GPS数据,因此各州公共卫生官员会对病毒在何处以及如何传播有了更好的了解。 该应用程序还向公共官员和帮助开发该应用程序的Twenty Holdings Inc.提供了访问个人识别信息(例如用户名,位置数据和电话号码)的权限。 但是,在犹他州于4月启动该应用程序后, 只有200人下载了该应用程序。 官员们决定在6月关闭GPS功能。
“We’ve learned over the course of the past three months that location tracking isn’t popular,” state epidemiologist Dr. Angela Dunn told The Salt Lake Tribune. “And as a result, it hasn’t really been helpful to our contact-tracing efforts.”
州流行病学家安吉拉·邓恩(Angela Dunn)告诉 《盐湖论坛报》:“在过去的三个月中,我们已经知道位置跟踪并不流行。” “因此,它对我们的联系追踪工作并没有真正帮助。”
After Google and Apple refused to make their API available to countries that wanted to store data on a centralized server, France announced it would make its own app. The nation’s StopCovid app has been criticized for working poorly on iPhones, something France’s digital minister, Cédric O, blamed on Apple.
在Google和Apple拒绝向希望将数据存储在中央服务器上的国家/地区提供其API后,法国宣布将开发自己的应用。 法国的数字部长塞德里克·奥(CédricO)将此归咎于苹果,该国的StopCovid应用程序因在iPhone上的运行不佳而受到批评。
“Apple could have helped us,” he said in an interview with BFM TV. “We will remember this when the time comes.”
他在接受BFM TV采访时说:“苹果本可以为我们提供帮助。” “时间到了,我们会记住这一点。”
This was originally published on themarkup.org and is republished under an Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives Creative Commons license.
该版本最初发布在 themarkup.org上, 并根据 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives创用CC许可 重新发布 。
翻译自: https://onezero.medium.com/what-ever-happened-to-those-coronavirus-contact-tracing-apps-cd8483575ae2
相关文章:
这篇关于那些冠状病毒联系人追踪应用程序发生了什么?的文章就介绍到这儿,希望我们推荐的文章对编程师们有所帮助!